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INTRODUCTION: A SYSTEM IN CRISIS? 
In March 2013, the American Association of School Administrators 
(AASA) released a report1 to Congress recommending the reauthorization 
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the primary 
federal statute regulating the provision of services to disabled children by 
local school districts.2 The report critiqued the special education due 
process system of IDEA3 in scathing terms, stating that “significant dollars, 
time, and emotional capitol [sic] . . . continue to be expended on a process 
that has little, if any, real connection to improving education outcomes.”4 
Special education due process, the report argues, fails to satisfy the 
expectations of both parents and school districts, while also hindering the 
ability of low- and middle-income parents to obtain necessary services for 
their children.5 
Why, according to the AASA, is special education due process failing 
students and schools? The answers in the report are simple: too many 
lawyers and too much litigation.6 The AASA argues that school 
 
1 SASHA PUDELSKI, AM. ASS’N OF SCH. ADM’RS, RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION 
DUE PROCESS 2-3 (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy_and_ 
Advocacy/Public_Policy_Resources/Special_Education/AASARethinkingSpecialEdDueProcess.pdf. 
2 IDEA creates a statutory framework that imposes requirements on local educational 
agencies receiving funding from federal block grants and covers all students with disabilities, as 
defined by the statute. See infra Section I.B.  
3 IDEA requires states to create administrative adjudication processes for parents and 
students to challenge decisions of the local education agency. These administrative hearings are 
commonly referred to as “special education due process hearings.” See infra Section I.B. 
4 PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 2. 
5 Id. at 7. 
6 See id. at 3-4 (noting the significant costs of litigation of the current due process system and 
the future possibility of positive outcomes from transforming such litigation into mediation). The 
AASA is not the only group to criticize the IDEA due process system. The litigious nature of 
special education due process has been frequently denounced. See, e.g., Cali Cope-Kasten, Bidding 
(Fair)well to Due Process: The Need For a Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 
42 J.L. & EDUC. 501, 520-23 (2013) (examining due process hearings and noting the challenges 
that parents face when litigating against school districts); Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha & 
Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping Judicialization in Special Education Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 
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administrators agree to unreasonable parental demands in the face of threats 
of due process complaints or litigation.7 Teachers and other school staff are 
“profoundly affected” by the “degree of stress experienced” during due 
process hearings.8 Districts are compelled to pay the fees both for their own 
attorneys and for the attorneys of prevailing parents.9 
Based on this critique, the AASA’s recommendations to Congress center 
around one simple principle: get lawyers, especially parents’ lawyers, out of 
special education. The AASA recommends a variety of nonadversarial 
facilitation and mediation sessions designed to solve disputes without the 
formalized due process hearings of the current system.10 Failing this, the 
AASA recommends a system of independent consultant review prior to 
litigation.11 Throughout this process, parents (and schools) would not have a 
lawyer in the room to advocate for them, or even to offer advice.12 
School policymakers are not alone in showing increasing concern for the 
litigious nature of special education due process. In one recent case, a 
district court took the extraordinary step of imposing the school district’s 
costs and fees on a mother deemed overly vexatious in pursuing her 
children’s education due process claims.13 The court took this extreme step 
even though the mother won a jury verdict against the district in her section 
504 retaliation claim.14 This case was unusual because of its combination of 
a particularly aggressive parent and a deteriorating relationship with the 
school, but the language used in the district court’s order is striking: 
“Meetings were piled on meetings, conferences on conferences, demands on 
demands, all of which took teacher and staff time and left district personnel 
 
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27, 46-48 (2007) (noting increasing legalism in IDEA 
hearings as well as increasing length and complexity). 
7 PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 3. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 3. 
10 Id. at 4. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. v. Zhou, No. 09-3493, 2013 WL 1415843, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 
9, 2013). 
14 Sara K. Satullo, Bethlehem Area School District Retaliated Against Parent, Jury Finds, LEHIGH 
VALLEY LIVE (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/bethlehem/index.ssf/2012/08/ 
bethlehem_area_school_district_75.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6NRX-9UMC. Section 504 
is a section of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that applies to all programs and activities that receive 
federal financial assistance from the Department of Education. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). See 
generally Protecting Students with Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions About Section 504 and the 
Education of Children with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/504faq.html (last visited May 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T3KB-K295. Section 
504 forbids exclusion from programs, denial of benefits, or discrimination on the basis of 
disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794.  
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frustrated.”15 Media reports focused on the mother’s primary goal of 
securing placement for her children at an expensive private school at the 
district’s expense and how she “abused” due process complaints to that 
end.16 
The AASA report argues that most due process complaints are similar to 
this case: wealthy, litigious parents and their lawyers making unreasonable 
demands on school districts, which comply because they fear the costs of 
litigation in an era of diminishing school budgets.17 Moreover, the AASA 
argues, these due process complaints only create deadweight loss; the AASA 
report cites district success rates in due process hearings and notes that 
districts win “overwhelmingly” in the most common areas of due process 
disputes.18 Finally, the AASA believes that the due process system excludes 
low-income parents, leading to low rates of due process complaints in 
poorer districts.19 
A central concern expressed in the AASA report is that the due process 
system is too backward-looking: hearings focus too much on IDEA’s 
“compliance requirements” and not enough on whether the education 
provided by the district will help the child make meaningful progress.20 
Hearing officers are too quick to award remedies to parents for “procedural 
technicalities” instead of examining whether the school’s plan will result in 
meaningful education progress for the child.21 The AASA argues that this 
emphasis on procedural requirements of the law, combined with lawyer 
hearing officers and the judicialized nature of the hearing process, has 
resulted in a system that provides too much retrospective relief without 
focusing enough on the prospective fate of students with disabilities.22 
This Comment examines the role of lawyers in special education due 
process hearings in Pennsylvania and disagrees with the narratives 
presented in the AASA report and the secondary literature that depict 
 
15 Zhou, 2013 WL 1415843, at *12. 
16 Colin McEvoy, Diana Zhou Abused Law to Drive up Bethlehem Area School District Costs, 
Judge Rules, LEHIGH VALLEY LIVE (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/bethlehem/ 
index.ssf/2013/04/judge_diana_zhou_abused_law_to.html, archived at http://perma.cc/24YY-E9RU. 
17 PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
18 Id. at 16. 
19 Id. at 11; see also Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How IDEA 
Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Educational 
Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 113-14 (2011) (noting that wealthy 
parents able to afford representation faired significantly better in due process hearings). 
20 PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 21. 
21 Id. Hearing officers are required to be attorneys, but not necessarily experts in special 
education or disability law. Id. at 16. 
22 Id. at 21. 
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special education due process as a failed system. Based on a combination of 
empirical analysis of the outcomes of 512 due process hearings from five 
years in Pennsylvania (the 2008–2009 academic year through the 2012–2013 
academic year) and interviews with members of Pennsylvania’s special 
education bar, I argue that while IDEA due process is not a perfect system, 
its adversarial aspects have valuable benefits for parents, especially given the 
stark disparity in access to information for parents in disputes with school 
districts. In marked contrast to the AASA’s narrative of due process as a 
failed system, in practice, Pennsylvania’s current due process system is a 
valuable safeguard of parents’ rights that does not impose overly 
burdensome litigation costs. Parents in Pennsylvania have a markedly higher 
rate of success in IDEA due process than in other states; this is likely due, 
at least in part, to the availability of experienced, specialized counsel. 
Existing proposed reforms to IDEA lack discussion of the value added to 
the system by lawyers, focusing instead on the negative aspects created by 
an adversarial system. In addition, studies criticizing due process often fail 
to acknowledge how little litigation there is compared to the total number 
of students eligible for services under IDEA. 
Further, while there is likely significant income disparity in access to the 
due process system because parents with counsel are much more successful 
than parents without counsel, this does not mean that we should attempt to 
level the playing field by limiting parents’ access to lawyers. Instead, we 
should do more to ensure greater access to counsel for all parents so that 
meritorious claims are more likely to succeed in due process hearings. 
Rather than trying to remove lawyers from the system, reforms should focus 
on leveling the playing field for pro se parents and liberalizing fee-shifting 
rules to encourage attorneys to take on meritorious cases. This is 
particularly important because many reform proposals discount the effects 
of the recent trend of shrinking school budgets on school administrators’ 
incentives. An adversarial process is necessary to ensure compliance with 
IDEA’s substantive requirements in a budgetary climate where districts are 
under pressure to keep per-student spending as low as possible. If additional 
systems of dispute resolution focused on prospective remedies are created, 
they should be used to supplement, not supplant, the existing due process 
hearing system. 
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I. IDEA IN PENNSYLVANIA 
A. Background 
The number of students with disabilities in public schools is significant 
and growing. In 2010, there were approximately 262,000 students with 
IDEA-qualifying disabilities in Pennsylvania, representing approximately 
16% of all enrolled students.23 In 2012, there were 17,916 students with 
disabilities in the Philadelphia School District alone, representing 13.83% of 
the total student body.24 Both of these numbers roughly track the 
nationwide percentage, which stood at 13.1% in 2009–2010.25 Historically, 
the number of students with qualifying disabilities has steadily increased, 
from 8.3% in 1976–1977 to 13.1% in 2009–2010.26 
Spending on special education represents an increasing proportion of 
the budget for many school systems nationwide.27 In one study of nine large 
urban districts across the United States, special education funding’s portion 
of total school spending increased 17.3% from 1967 to 2005.28 Compensatory 
education awards for special education are also consuming an increasing 
proportion of school budgets, with per-pupil adjusted spending on 
compensatory education awards rising 81% from 1991 to 2005.29 While 
special education students account for only about 13% of the student body in 
most districts,30 schools spend a disproportionate amount of their funding 
on special education students.31 In Philadelphia, special education support 
 
23 DATA DISPLAY: PENNSYLVANIA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (2013), available at http://www2.ed.gov/ 
fund/data/report/idea/partbspap/2013/pa-acc-stateprofile-11-12.pdf. IDEA defines conditions that 
constitute a disability for purposes of the Act as “intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments 
(including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), 
serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other 
health impairments, or specific learning disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012). 
24 District Schools, SCH. DIST. PHILA., http://www.phila.k12.pa.us/about/#schools (last 
updated Dec. 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/SP6P-JXM3. 
25 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2011, at 61 
(2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012001.pdf. 
26 Id. 
27 See Juan Diego Alonso & Richard Rothstein, Where Has The Money Been Going? A Preliminary 
Update 1 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., Briefing Paper No. 281, 2010), available at http://www.epi.org/files/page/-
/pdf/bp281.pdf. 
28 Id. at 5 tbl.7. 
29 Id. at 7 tbl.9. 
30 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 25. 
31 Alonso & Rothstein, supra note 27, at 9 tbl.12, at 61. 
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services and classroom instruction cost approximately $223 million of the 
$1.3 billion instructional operating budget in 2012.32 
Meanwhile, school funding has been decreasing or remaining constant in 
recent years.33 This is particularly true in urban districts such as 
Philadelphia, which face increasing pressures from reduced state funding 
and flat local property tax revenues.34 Pennsylvania exemplifies the strain on 
school budgets because of its heavy reliance on local funding.35 Pennsylvania 
has capped special education funding for five years despite an increase in 
the number of special education students during that period.36  
In addition, the floor for federal funding to states for IDEA has 
remained stable since the mid-2000s despite increasing expenditures on 
special education services at the school-district level.37 As discussed, IDEA 
imposes its substantive requirements only on states that accept federal block 
grants. In 2008, those block grants paid approximately 17% of the “excess 
cost” of educating children with disabilities.38 In 2014, the federal funds 
 
32 See SCH. DIST. PHILA., FY 2013–14 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET 68 (2013), available at 
http://webgui.phila.k12.pa.us/uploads/lA/ad/lAadBw8mA0yvC4FYRwrovg/FY2013-14-Consolidated-
Budget.pdf (noting that $223 million of the $1.3 billion instructional operating budget was 
composed of $111 million for special education high incidence services and $112 million for special 
education low incidence services). 
33 See MICHAEL LEACHMAN & CHRIS MAI, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
MOST STATES FUNDING SCHOOLS LESS THAN BEFORE THE RECESSION 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-12-13sfp.pdf (finding that thirty-five states provided less funding per 
student in the 2013–2014 school year than before the 2008 economic recession, and that any recent 
funding increases have not compensated for the cuts made in the years since 2007). 
34 See Trip Gabriel, Budget Cuts Reach Bone for Philadelphia Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
2013, at A9 (noting that rising pension costs, debt service, and a block grant formula that disfavors 
urban districts have resulted in steep cuts to instructional budgets in Philadelphia). 
35 See, e.g., EDUC. LAW CTR., FUNDING, FORMULAS, AND FAIRNESS: WHAT PENNSYLVANIA 
CAN LEARN FROM OTHER STATES’ EDUCATION FUNDING FORMULAS 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.elc-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ELC_schoolfundingreport.2013.pdf (arguing 
that Pennsylvania’s school funding formula is one of the most regressive in the nation due to 
failure to make up for disparities in local tax revenues); Justin DiBerardinis & Michael Churchill, 
How Schools Are Funded in Pennsylvania: A Primer, NOTEBOOK (May 23, 2007), 
http://thenotebook.org/summer-2007/07104/how-schools-are-funded-pennsylvania-primer, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5E4S-JY62 (explaining that wealthy suburban districts are able to raise more 
money at lower local property tax rates than poorer urban districts with higher property tax rates). 
36 See Steve Esack, State Panel: Change Special Education Funding Formula, MORNING CALL 
(Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.mcall.com/news/nationworld/pennsylvania/mc-pa-browne-special-
education-funding-20131211,0,4624878.story, archived at http://perma.cc/NCW9-W3J7 (reporting 
that Pennsylvania capped special education funding since the 2008–2009 fiscal year despite a 3% 
increase in special education students during that period). 
37 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act—Funding Distribution, FED. EDUC. BUDGET 
PROJECT (Apr. 25, 2014), http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/individuals-disabilities-
education-act-funding-distribution, archived at http://perma.cc/8ENZ-8AN6. 
38 Id. 
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paid only 16%.39 This is significantly less than the 40% federal contribution 
target set by Congress in the statute,40 and imposes a significant financial 
burden on strained state budgets. The 2014 funding level translated to a 
shortfall of $17.17 billion between the statutory targeted funding level and 
the actual funding.41 
 B. Statutory Framework of IDEA 
IDEA creates a statutory framework that imposes requirements on all 
local educational agencies receiving funding from federal block grants. 
Passed in 1975 as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, IDEA 
has been reauthorized and amended several times, significantly in 1997 and 
most recently in 2004.42  
The fundamental requirement of the IDEA is a “free appropriate public 
education” (FAPE) for all students with qualifying disabilities.43 FAPE is 
not defined in the statute, but has instead been left open to judicial 
interpretation. The Supreme Court has interpreted FAPE as an education 
that is “reasonably calculated” to provide “access to specialized instruction 
and related services which are individually designed to provide educational 
benefit to the handicapped child.”44 This is a procedural requirement only. It 
requires the school district to “adopt procedures which would result in 
individualized consideration of and instruction for each child.”45 The Third 
Circuit has imposed various substantive requirements for FAPE, requiring 
that the educational plan provide “more than a trivial educational benefit”46 
and confer a “meaningful benefit”47 that is “gauged in relation to the child’s 
potential.”48 FAPE must be provided in the least restrictive environment, 
requiring that children with disabilities are mainstreamed into regular 
educational settings to the “maximum extent appropriate.”49 The statute 
 
39 Id. 
40 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
41 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act—Funding Distribution, supra note 37. 
42 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN 
WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 6, 9 (2010), available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/osers/idea35/history/idea-35-history.pdf (discussing various amendments to the IDEA). 
43 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012). “Qualifying disabilities” under the statute are broadly 
defined. Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i). 
44 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201, 204 
(1982) (citations omitted). 
45 Id. at 189. 
46 Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1988). 
47 Id. at 184. 
48 Id. at 185. 
49 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012). 
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also imposes on districts “child find” obligations to identify and evaluate 
students with disabilities.50 
School districts are required to provide all students with qualifying 
disabilities with an individualized education plan (IEP) that provides the 
child with FAPE.51 Districts must involve and inform parents about the IEP 
process so that they can make informed decisions and provide input about 
their child’s education.52 In the event of a dispute between parents and 
districts, IDEA provides a variety of resolution mechanisms.53 All formal 
dispute resolutions under IDEA in Pennsylvania are coordinated by and 
through the Pennsylvania Department of Education’s Office for Dispute 
Resolution (ODR).54 
Parents have a right to an impartial due process hearing to resolve 
alleged IDEA violations.55 Due process hearings are adversarial, but have 
relaxed procedural requirements and evidentiary rules compared to 
traditional court settings. A due process hearing is only “quasi-judicial,” but 
incorporates many of the elements of a trial proceeding.56 Because “the 
party who request[s] the hearing bears the initial burden of production of 
evidence,” parents who bring a complaint must present their case before the 
district.57 The Supreme Court held in 2005 that the burden of proof in an 
IDEA due process hearing rests on the party seeking relief under the 
statute, whether that party is the parent or the district.58 While the formal 
rules of evidence do not apply, hearing officers will “rule on any specific 
objections” to witnesses and questions.59 A hearing officer may also admit or 
deny evidence at his or her discretion if it is not “relevant and material to 
 
50 Id. § 1412(a)(3). 
51 Id. § 1412(a)(4). 
52 See id. § 1415(d) (setting out the requirements for an IEP and the requisite parties for an 
IEP team). 
53 See id. § 1415(b) (describing the procedures education agencies must follow to guarantee 
every eligible child is provided with a FAPE); see also id. § 1415(d) (requiring that notice of 
procedural safeguards be provided to parents). 
54 See 22 PA. CODE § 14.107 (2014) (confirming that “the Department will establish a complaint 
procedure . . . and disseminate notice of that procedure”); see also OFFICE FOR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, PENNSYLVANIA SPECIAL EDUCATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION MANUAL 3 (2013) 
[hereinafter ODR MANUAL], available at http://odr-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Dispute-
Resolution-Manual.pdf (“The Office for Dispute Resolution (ODR) coordinates the 
administration of the statewide special education dispute resolution system in Pennsylvania.”). 
55 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f ) (1)(A). 
56 See ODR MANUAL, supra note 54, at 16-18 (explaining that due process hearings include 
opening statements, the presentation of evidence, and closing statements). 
57 Id. at 18. 
58 Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005). 
59 ODR MANUAL, supra note 54, at 21. 
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the issues.”60 Over time, due process hearings have become more 
“judicialized” and have transitioned away from the informal type of 
proceeding originally envisioned by Congress.61 Parents or districts can 
appeal administrative due process hearing decisions in federal district 
court.62 Administrative exhaustion is required before any remedy based on 
IDEA may be pursued in court.63 
Before a due process hearing, a resolution meeting between the parents 
and the district must occur, in which “the parents of the child discuss their 
complaint . . . and the local educational agency is provided the opportunity 
to resolve the complaint.”64 At these meetings, a lawyer may represent the 
district only if the parent also has representation.65 If the case settles at this 
phase, the settlement agreement is enforceable in federal court.66 IDEA also 
requires the state or local educational agency to provide an opportunity for 
mediation at the state’s cost.67 An agreement reached through mediation is 
enforceable in federal court.68 The ODR also offers “IEP facilitation,” a 
voluntary process in which the parent and district both agree to the 
presence of a neutral third-party to “facilitate communication and the 
successful drafting of the student’s IEP.”69 IEP facilitators serve in this role 
only part-time and come from a variety of backgrounds.70 Unlike ODR 
hearing decisions, the IEPs resulting from a facilitated IEP have no greater 
binding effect than other IEPs; thus, parties must resort to the due process 
system to enforce their provisions.71 
 
60 Id. at 23. 
61 See S. REP. NO. 105-17, at 26 (1997) (expressing the Senate Committee’s “strong preference 
that mediation become the norm for resolving disputes under IDEA” prior to renewal of IDEA in 
1997); Zirkel, Karanxha & D’Angelo, supra note 6, at 47-48 (noting increasing legalism, length, and 
complexity in IDEA hearings). 
62 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2012). 
63 A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir. 2007). 
64 20 U.S.C. § 1415( f )(1)(B)(i)(IV). 
65 Id. § 1415( f )(1)(B)(i)(III). 
66 Id. § 1415( f )(1)(B)(iii)(II). 
67 Id. § 1415(e). 
68 Id. § 1415(e)(2)(F). 
69 IEP Facilitation, THE OFFICE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, http://odr-pa.org/alternative-
dispute-resolution/iep-facilitation (last visited May 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/49HK-
CHFG. 
70 FACILITATORS’ NAMES AND OCCUPATIONS, THE OFFICE FOR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION (2014), available at http://odr-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/iepfac2.pdf. 
71 See ALLIANCE/CADRE, FACILITATED IEP MEETINGS: AN EMERGING PRACTICE 
7 (2004), available at http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Facilitated%20IEP%20for%20CA 
DRE%20English.pdf (noting that if parents believe that a facilitated IEP was not satisfactory, 
they do not forfeit any rights to other forms of dispute resolution). 
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There are a variety of equitable remedies available to parents if the 
hearing officer determines that the school district violated IDEA.72 Money 
damages, however, are not available.73 The five most common categories of 
IDEA injunctive remedies are tuition reimbursement for private school 
placements, compensatory education, prospective revisions of IEPs, changes 
in student placement, and independent educational evaluations.74 While the 
latter three remedies prospectively order the district to change its behavior 
in the future, the former two are compensatory. Tuition reimbursement is 
ordered when the hearing officer determines that the district was unable to 
provide the necessary services to the student; therefore the district must 
pay to place the child in a private school that can provide the student with 
FAPE.75 Compensatory education requires the district to provide additional 
hours of instructional time to compensate for the previous denial of 
FAPE.76 
Throughout all of these procedures, including a due process hearing, a 
parent does not need to be represented by counsel. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court ruled in 2007 that IDEA allows parents to proceed pro se in an 
appeal from a due process decision in federal court.77 In Pennsylvania, 
parents are explicitly barred from bringing counsel to mediation.78 
 
72 See generally Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers Under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 1 [hereinafter Zirkel, Remedial Authority] (examining types of equitable relief available 
under IDEA, such as tuition reimbursement, compensatory education, and prospective 
placement). The statute itself is silent on what relief a hearing officer may grant, but authorizes a 
district court reviewing a hearing officer decision to “grant such relief as the court determines is 
appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). 
73 See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 802-03 (3d Cir. 2007) (rejecting a Section 
1983 claim for damages based on IDEA violations and limiting remedies to those delineated in the 
statute); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE Under the IDEA, 33 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 214, 219-20 (2013) [hereinafter Zirkel, Adjudicative 
Remedies] (noting “the prevailing judicial view that monetary damages are not available under the 
IDEA” (citations omitted)). 
74 Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies, supra note 73, at 219 (citing Zirkel, Remedial Authority, supra 
note 72, at 15-24). 
75 See Zirkel, Remedial Authority, supra note 72, at 18-21 (discussing the three-part test for 
awarding tuition reimbursement).  
76 Id. at 21-26; see also Octavia P. ex rel. Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(holding that in IDEA, “Congress empowered the courts to grant a compensatory remedy,” 
encouraging courts to fashion that remedy to the individual circumstances of the student). 
77 See Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 526 (2007) (“The parents enjoy 
enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory 
scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal court.”). It is unclear whether 
parents’ rights in the Winkelman framework encompass all of the same rights of the student. See 
Sonja Kerr, Winkelman: Pro Se Parents of Children with Disabilities in the Courts (Or Not?), 26 
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This does not mean that proceeding pro se is the optimal route in a due 
process hearing. On the opposing side, school districts are required by law 
to be represented by counsel at an IEP due process hearing.79 This means 
that a parent proceeding pro se is always against an attorney. In addition, 
the due process hearing system requires a significant amount of legal 
sophistication. A due process complaint may be dismissed if it fails to 
adequately set forth with specificity the violations identified and the desired 
relief.80 Further, because the complainant has the burden of production, he 
or she will be required to present his or her case and examine witnesses 
before the district presents its case.81 
For parents represented by counsel, IDEA allows the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees, at the court’s discretion, from the local or state education 
agency.82 Several Supreme Court decisions have construed this provision 
not to include other litigation costs such as expert fees83 and restricted the 
definition of “prevailing party.”84  
The Supreme Court’s invalidation of the “catalyst” theory for the award 
of attorneys’ fees in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Resources and the Court’s adoption of a 
more limited definition of “prevailing party” for civil rights cases has 
significantly impacted IDEA fee-shifting.85 Under the catalyst theory, a 
plaintiff may be considered a prevailing party for the purpose of a fee-
shifting statute if it can “prove that the existence of the lawsuit 
accomplished the original objectives of the lawsuit without a formal 
judgment.”86 In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that a party could 
 
ALASKA L. REV. 271, 283-85 (2009) (examining post-Winkelman decisions and finding that courts 
carefully distinguish between parents’ own rights and those of their children). 
78 OFFICE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, YOUR GUIDE TO MEDIATION 2 (n.d.), available at 
http://odr-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/medguide.pdf [hereinafter PA. MEDIATION GUIDE]. 
79 ODR MANUAL, supra note 54, at 12. However, an attorney cannot represent the district at 
the pre-hearing resolution meeting if the parent is not accompanied by an attorney. Id. at 26. 
80 Id. at 24-26. 
81 Id. at 18. 
82 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2012). 
83 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297 (2006) (holding 
that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) “does not even hint [that a State is responsible] for reimbursing 
prevailing parents for services rendered by experts”).  
84 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.V. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (“Our precedents thus counsel against holding that the term ‘prevailing 
party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees without a corresponding alteration in the legal 
relationship of the parties.”), partially superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii) (2012), as 
recognized in Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 2014).  
85 Id.  
86 Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 544 (3d Cir. 1994), overruled by 
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602-05. 
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recover fees only if it obtained a “judgment on the merits” or a court-
enforceable consent decree.87 Post-Buckhannon, fees are recoverable only 
following a favorable hearing officer decision.88 The alternative is to reach a 
settlement including fees, but this is usually possible only after a due 
process complaint has been filed and a resolution meeting held.89 
Settlement itself poses special problems in IDEA cases, both for pro se 
parents and those with counsel.90 Settlements reached at mediation or 
resolution meetings are theoretically enforceable in court, provided they are 
signed by both the parent and a school district with binding authority.91 But 
this poses pitfalls for unrepresented parents, who may inadvertently give up 
important rights provided by the statute in a settlement agreement.92 For 
represented parents, the aforementioned fees dilemma can become 
problematic.93 Further complicating the process, an unsettled question 
remains whether it is necessary to exhaust IDEA due process prior to the 
enforcement of settlement agreements in court.94 
The rates of IDEA due process use vary widely from state to state. 
Pennsylvania has one of the highest rates of IDEA due process use in the 
country.95 Four states (New York, California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) 
 
87 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (citations omitted). 
88 John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556-58 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
89 See infra Part III (discussing the districts’ reluctance to settle claims prior to resolution 
meetings); see also Stefan R. Hanson, Buckhannon, Special Education Disputes, and Attorneys’ Fees: 
Time for a Congressional Response Again, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 519, 546 (“[A]fter Buckhannon, 
plaintiffs must either make the matter of attorneys’ fees a negotiating issue in the settlement 
discussions or choose to appear pro se . . . .”); Roberta Walker, Attorney’s Fees Under IDEA 2004: 
Who Will Take the Case?, 35 ADVOC. (TEX.) 64, 69 (2004) (“Because Buckhannon leaves parents 
who settle before the initiation of formal procedures no fee recovery at all, early settlement is 
actually discouraged by its application.”). 
90 See Mark C. Weber, Settling Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Cases: Making Up Is 
Hard to Do, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 641, 647-49 (2010) (discussing how IDEA’s complicated 
hearing process, including the requirement of the availability of mediation and ambiguous 
interpretations of the enforceability of settlements, makes settling IDEA cases particularly 
difficult). 
91 Id. at 648. 
92 See id. at 652 (noting that although parties can challenge the enforcement of settlement 
agreements on the basis of public policy, courts have been unwilling to overturn settlement 
agreements when parents inadvertently bargained away basic protections IDEA provides). 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 82-89 (discussing the attendant problems attorneys’ fees 
can pose for parents represented by counsel). 
94 Weber, supra note 90, at 654-56 (distinguishing cases in courts that have required such 
exhaustion of due process before enforcing settlement agreements from those that have not). 
95 See Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under the IDEA: A State-by-
State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD., 2010, at 3, 4-5 (noting that in 2008–2009, only three 
states and the District of Columbia had more due process hearings reach a final decision than 
Pennsylvania). 
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and the District of Columbia account for approximately 85% of due process 
hearings nationwide.96 Across the country, as the use of due process has 
increased, special education due process appeals have come to represent an 
increasing percentage of the education-related litigation in federal court.97 
Despite the overall increase in the number of cases, only a relatively low 
number of appeals reach the district courts.98 Indeed, the number of special 
education cases reaching the federal courts is miniscule compared to the 
number of students eligible for special education under IDEA. While an 
average of 6.6 million students were covered by the statute each year from 
2000 to 2007, only approximately 400 IDEA appeals per year were even filed 
in district court during this period.99 
II. EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF COUNSEL IN 
PENNSYLVANIA DUE PROCESS HEARINGS 
A. Previous Empirical Studies of the Effect of Counsel in  
Pennsylvania and Other Jurisdictions 
At least one study has previously examined the effect of counsel on 
IDEA due process hearings in Pennsylvania. In the 1980s, Dr. Peter Kuriloff 
studied the first four years of hearings under IDEA just after it went into 
effect in 1975.100 In the study, Dr. Kuriloff examined 168 cases from that 
period that went to a hearing, finding that parents won and received some 
relief in 35% of the decisions.101 The study looked at the role of counsel and 
found that while having an attorney strongly correlated with the perceived 
quality of the parents’ presentation, the mere presence of an attorney did 
not have a statistically significant effect on the outcome.102 However, the 
number of witnesses put on by parents in a particular case did have a 
significant effect on the outcome.103 As Dr. Kuriloff noted, “effective hearing 
 
96 Id. at 5. 
97 See Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: An Updated 
Analysis, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 3, 5 tbl.2 (2011) (finding that special education litigation in federal 
courts almost doubled from the 1990s to the 2000s). 
98 See id. (explaining that there were still less than one hundred reported cases per year 
nationwide in the last decade). 
99 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Judiciary’s Now-Limited Role in Special Education, in FROM 
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 121, 
127-28 ( Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009). 
100 Peter J. Kuriloff, Is Justice Served by Due Process?: Affecting the Outcome of Special Education 
Hearings in Pennsylvania, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1985, at 89, 96-97. 
101 Id. at 99. 
102 Id. at 107-08. 
103 Id. at 108-09. 
  
2015] Getting Their Due (Process) 1819 
 
behavior for parents required use of the full panoply of adversary skills.”104 
This study suggests that even in the early years of the IDEA, when the 
system was less judicialized and the legal standards less developed, the 
ability to deftly navigate the procedural aspects of a due process hearing was 
critical. 
More recent studies in other states have found that having an attorney is 
crucial to parental success in due process hearings. In a study of 343 IDEA 
due process hearings in Illinois over a five-year period, parents prevailed in 
only 38.3% of the cases they brought against school districts.105 In that 
sample, attorneys represented the parents in only 44% of hearings.106 
Attorney representation was critical to success: parents who were 
represented succeeded in obtaining relief 50.4% of the time, while parents 
proceeding pro se succeeded only 16.8% of the time.107 
A recent examination of 210 due process hearings in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota over a ten-year period also found a great disparity between 
parents represented by counsel and unrepresented parents.108 In that 
sample, 26% of hearings involved unrepresented parents and none of those 
hearings resulted in a victory for the parents.109 Even where parents were 
represented, they succeeded in obtaining relief in less than 15% of 
hearings.110 
 B. Sample Characteristics 
For this Comment, I examined 526 decisions from Pennsylvania ODR 
issued between February 2008 and September 2013.111 I coded decisions 
according to whether the parents and student or the district prevailed.112 
 
104 Id. at 108. 
105 Melanie Archer, Access and Equity in the Due Process System: Attorney Representation 
and Hearing Outcomes in Illinois, 1997–2002, at 6 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf. 
106 Id. at 7. 
107 Id. 
108 Cope-Kasten, supra note 6, at 528. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Hearing officer decisions are publicly available on ODR’s website. Decisions are redacted 
to remove identifying information about minor students and their parents. See Hearing Officer 
Decisions, OFFICE FOR DISP. RESOL., http://odr-pa.org/due-process/hearing-officer-decision 
(last visited May 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FT6K-7NXM (providing a listing of all 
hearing officer decisions, beginning with the 2006–2007 fiscal year). 
112 I coded a decision for the parents if there was a compensatory education award for the 
student; the parents received tuition, transportation, or independent educational evaluation 
reimbursement; or the parents were successful in blocking the district’s chosen placement. I coded 
a decision for the district if it provided no relief for the parents or only an order for a new IEP 
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The hearing officer decisions provide the name and affiliation of parents’ 
counsel, if present, and the number of hearing sessions held in a case. 
 C. Results 
Of the 512 coded decisions within the designated period, 252 hearings 
(49.22%) resulted in a favorable outcome for the district, and 247 (48.24%) 
resulted in a favorable outcome for the student.113 Table 1 presents due 
process hearing results by year. These overall numbers reflect a higher level 
of parental success than previous studies of IDEA due process hearings in 
Pennsylvania and elsewhere.114  
 
Table 1: Due Process Hearing Results by Year115 
 
 2012–
2013 
2011–
2012 
2010–
2011 
2009–
2010 
2008–
2009 
Total 
Total Decisions 74 113 105 122 112 512 
For District 38 56 51 67 40 252 
For Student 32 48 50 51 66 247 
For Student % 43.24% 42.48% 47.62% 41.80% 58.93% 48.24% 
 
Analyzing these numbers according to the presence of counsel reveals 
some interesting trends. Counsel represented parents in roughly three-
quarters of all hearings (383 of 512 hearings, or 74.80%). In those hearings, 
parents prevailed 58.75% of the time. Pro se parents, involved in the 
remaining one-quarter of hearings (129 hearings, or 25.20%), had a much 
lower rate of success, prevailing only 16.28% of the time. The presence of 
 
meeting. I excluded from both the student and district categories decisions lacking codeable 
determinations. These instances included cases where the due process hearing was a dispute 
between parents, where the court awarded relief to both parties, or where the court awarded a 
different remedy than that sought by either party. Coding IDEA decisions always requires an 
element of discretion because of the equitable nature of the relief awarded. See Cope-Kasten, supra 
note 6, at 520 (reviewing due process decisions in Minnesota and coding parent victories into the 
four categories of (1) compensatory education awards, (2) reversed manifestation determinations, 
(3) changes in placement, and (4) specific course of action); Archer, supra note 105, at 3 (coding 
decisions where the parent “substantially prevailed on at least one, but not necessarily all, of the 
major issues” as parent successes). 
113 This total encompasses all cases, including those not categorized as student or district 
victories. The number of cases not categorized, however, is negligible, totaling only thirteen cases 
over the studied period. 
114 See supra Section II.A. 
115 Totals in Table 1 include cases that were not coded as district or parent victories. 
Therefore, the sum of each column does not match the total. See supra note 112. 
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counsel was also correlated with the number of hearing sessions, with 
represented parents having more hearing sessions on average than pro se 
parents.116 Success rates for parents varied each year, but the gap between 
the success rate of parents with counsel and that of pro se parents remained 
consistent.117 Table 2 shows results of due process hearings, separated by 
presence of counsel and by year. 
 
Table 2: Due Process Hearings with Counsel and Pro Se118 
 
 2012–
2013 
2011–
2012 
2010–
2011 
2009–
2010 
2008–
2009 
Total 
Total Decisions 74 113 105 122 112 512 
With Counsel 51 77 75 96 84 383 
For District 21 35 26 45 25 225 
For Student 29 39 48 50 59 152 
For Student % 56.86% 50.65% 64.00% 52.08% 70.24% 58.75% 
Pro Se 22 30 28 23 26 129 
For District 17 21 25 20 15 21 
For Student 3 8 2 1 7 98 
For Student % 13.64% 26.67% 7.14% 4.35% 26.92% 16.28% 
 
Despite the clear advantage counsel representation provides, some 
parents with viable claims still proceeded pro se.119 These cases represent a 
small percentage of the overall sample, about 4%. The twenty-one cases in 
which parents proceeding pro se prevailed included awards of significant 
amounts of compensatory education, tuition reimbursement for private 
school tuition, compensation for independent educational evaluations, and 
orders barring district recommended placements.  
 
116 In the overall sample, the mean number of hearings was 2.96 and the median was 2. 
Counsel affected the number of hearings: hearings involving represented parents took a mean of 
3.5 sessions to complete (median 3), while pro se parents completed their cases on average in 1.5 
sessions (median 1). 
117 Differences in the rate of success between parents with counsel and pro se parents ranged 
from 23.9 percentage points in 2011–2012, to 56.86 percentage points in 2010–2011. Success rates 
for parents overall varied from a high of 58.93% in 2008–2009 to a low of 41.80% in 2009–2010. 
118 Totals in Table 2 include cases that were not coded as victories for district or parent. 
Therefore, the sum of each column does not match the total. See supra note 112. 
119 It is impossible to determine why these parents ended up in due process hearings without 
counsel (perhaps they believed they could be successful without an attorney). Relatedly, it is also 
impossible to determine whether this group consists of parents who consulted a lawyer and 
decided they could not afford or did not want counsel. 
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Hearing outcomes for parents represented by counsel were fairly stable 
regardless of the number of times a particular attorney appeared in due 
process hearings in the overall sample.120 In addition, the average number of 
hearing sessions was relatively constant across attorneys, with the more 
frequent players using approximately the same number of hearing sessions 
to present their cases as the attorneys appearing only one time in five 
years.121 The number of hearings seemed to have only a small effect on the 
success rate for parents.122 
The vast majority of parents with counsel were represented by members 
of the private bar. Less than twenty-five of the 383 cases where parents were 
represented by counsel involved attorneys from nonprofit or legal aid 
groups. While it is unclear whether parents were represented by paid 
counsel or pro bono counsel, the overwhelming presence of repeat player 
lawyers (mostly members of the specialized special education bar) suggests 
that most private counsel were paid. 
The types of relief granted varied, with compensatory education and 
tuition reimbursement being the most common. In the most recent school 
year studied, 2012–2013, in cases where the parents prevailed, more than 
two-thirds of hearing officer orders mandated either compensatory 
education, tuition reimbursement, or both.123 Only about one-third of cases 
where parents prevailed resulted in orders that granted some kind of 
prospective relief or substantive IEP change for the student.124 Even where 
prospective relief was granted, however, few hearing officer orders included 
 
120 I analyzed the sample based on the number of times particular attorneys appeared in 
court in the five-year period. I classified counsel who appeared ten or more times as “super 
repeaters,” five to nine times as “repeaters,” and two to four times as “infrequent.” I also included 
single appearances. Success rates for parents were similar across these categories (60.39% for 
super-repeaters, 55.91% for repeaters, and 64.29% for counsel in the “infrequent” category, with a 
small dip to 48.28% for single appearances). There was more variation between individual 
attorneys, but the spread on the entire range was only about thirty percentage points. The largest 
sample size for the most frequent appearing attorney was quite small, at just twenty-four hearings. 
121 Super repeaters actually used slightly fewer hearing sessions on average (mean 3.38) than 
repeat attorneys (mean 3.64) and infrequent attorneys (mean 3.45). Attorneys who appeared only 
once in the sample again lagged slightly (mean 2.61). 
122 In hearings where parents were represented by counsel that went for five or more sessions 
(ninety-eight total hearings), parents prevailed 65% of the time. In hearings with counsel for 
parents that went for four or fewer sessions (279 total hearings), parents prevailed 57% of the time. 
Only eighteen total hearings involving pro se parents exceeded two sessions. 
123 In 2012–2013, of the thirty-one cases with resolutions favorable to the parents, twenty-two 
cases involved grants of either compensatory education, tuition reimbursement, or both to remedy 
prior violations of the statute by the school district. 
124 In 2012–2013, twelve decisions coded as favorable to the parents included prospective 
relief. Six decisions coded as favorable to the district also involved prospective orders in the form 
of setting new dates for IEP meetings.  
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detailed changes to the IEP itself, and the substance of the new IEP was 
usually left to future meetings between the parents and the district.125 
III. INTERVIEWS WITH PENNSYLVANIA’S SPECIAL EDUCATION BAR 
Because the vast majority of parents with counsel are represented by 
members of the private bar rather than pro bono or legal services attorneys, 
the enforcement of IDEA in Pennsylvania relies to a great extent on the 
private bar. The attitudes and motivations of private attorneys, as well as 
the practical aspects of representation, are areas that have gone largely 
unexplored in the literature.126 To fill this gap, I interviewed special 
education attorneys across Pennsylvania.127  
While all the attorneys interviewed seek attorneys’ fees through the 
IDEA fee-shifting provision in cases where they are the prevailing party, 
policies regarding retainers and client fees vary. At least one attorney takes 
all of his cases on a purely contingent basis and recovers all of his fees from 
districts.128 Some attorneys operate on a purely fee-for-service basis, 
requiring a combination of an up-front retainer and per-hour charges to 
parents.129 Others are somewhere between the two, with several attorneys 
requiring a retainer fee up-front, but later not charging a fee-for-service 
beyond the retainer and choosing to recover fees from the district instead.130 
None of the lawyers interviewed took a contingent percentage of 
compensatory education awards. 
All of the attorneys interviewed reported that they screen clients heavily 
for viable claims, and often refer parents to routes other than due process.131 
 
125 Only seven decisions from 2012–2013 included specific IEP changes in the order. 
126 See, e.g., Cope-Kasten, supra note 6, at 507-08 (using interviews with special education 
administrative law judges to shed light on an empirical study and the “fairness” of due process 
hearings); Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1422 (2011) (examining the theoretical role of private attorneys in 
IDEA enforcement). 
127 I selected attorneys to contact for interviews based on the frequency with which they 
appeared in the sample. I contacted the eight attorneys with the most appearances in the sample 
and four responded. I conducted interviews with an understanding that names and identifying 
information would be kept confidential; therefore, I use pseudonyms to conceal the identity of the 
attorneys. 
128 This attorney reported that the retainer “before the recession” was comparable with the 
market rate, but found that lowering the retainer after 2008 attracted more business while not 
detrimentally affecting the practice’s finances. Telephone Interview with A.B., Pa. attorney (Nov. 
4, 2013) (on file with author). 
129 Telephone Interview with C.D., Pa. attorney (Nov. 4, 2013) (on file with author). 
130 Telephone Interview with E.F., Pa. attorney (Nov. 4, 2013) (on file with author). 
131 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; Telephone Interview with C.D., supra 
note 129; Telephone Interview with E.F., supra note 130.  
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Specifically, attorneys estimated that 40% to 60% of parents are turned away 
at this screening stage because their problems are not likely to be resolved 
through due process.132 This suggests that a significant number of parents 
are directed to alternative routes when they first consult an attorney. Heavy 
screening of due process claims is further supported by anecdotal evidence 
of attorneys’ participation in IEP meetings prior to filing due process 
claims.133 
Settlement rates in IDEA cases are high. Attorneys’ estimates of the 
percentage of cases that are settled before a due process hearing varied from 
70% to over 90%.134 However, these settlement rates may be inflated as a 
function of strategic posturing. Several attorneys interviewed noted that 
because a due process complaint must be filed to obtain a judicially 
enforceable settlement, many cases require that the attorney file a due 
process complaint to get school districts to negotiate and settle.135 Districts 
usually acquiesce to a provision in the settlement agreement agreeing to pay 
the parents’ attorneys’ fees when a settlement is reached following a 
resolution meeting.136 
Several attorneys reported receiving remedies in settlements that would 
rarely have been ordered by a hearing officer after due process, most 
importantly specific prospective placements.137 While these remedies are not 
available under IDEA, awards have not been unusual in settlement. One 
tactic mentioned was bargaining a possible compensatory education award 
in exchange for a guaranteed placement from the district.138  
Several attorneys described the IDEA due process hearings as highly 
procedural and more technical than many parents expect.139 One attorney 
noted that his clients sometimes refer to a due process hearing as a 
“meeting” and are unaware of the formal and adversarial nature of the 
 
132  Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; Telephone Interview with C.D., supra 
note 129; Telephone Interview with E.F., supra note 130. 
133 Email from G.H., Pa. attorney, to Kevin Hoagland-Hanson (Nov. 4, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
134 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; Telephone Interview with C.D., supra 
note 129; Telephone Interview with E.F., supra note 130. 
135 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; Telephone Interview with C.D., supra 
note 129. 
136 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; Telephone Interview with C.D., supra note 
129; Telephone Interview with E.F., supra note 130; E-mail Interview with G.H., supra note 133. 
137 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; Telephone Interview with C.D., supra 
note 129. 
138 Telephone Interview with C.D., supra note 129. 
139 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; Telephone Interview with C.D., supra 
note 129; Telephone Interview with E.F., supra note 130. 
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proceeding.140 As a result, several attorneys doubted whether a pro se 
parent, even one knowledgeable about the IDEA, would be able to navigate 
the legalized setting of a due process hearing.141 These concerns relate 
particularly to tasks such as putting hostile school district personnel or 
experts on the stand. While several attorneys noted that the burden-shifting 
required by Shaffer v. Weast, under which parents must put forth their case 
first,142 probably hurt a pro se parent unfamiliar with the process, one 
attorney believed the opportunity to act as a traditional plaintiff and present 
the case to the hearing officer first was beneficial for parents represented by 
counsel.143 
When asked about district compliance with IDEA and why the number 
of due process hearings remains significant thirty years after the enactment 
of the statute, one attorney noted that increased incidences of 
noncompliance were an inevitable result of the tension between the 
procedural and substantive IDEA requirements and the budget and staffing 
situation of districts.144 As one attorney put it, there is a “natural tension” 
between districts that want to do as little as possible while complying with 
the law and parents who want as much as possible for their children.145 
Several attorneys, however, also noted that systematic failures were rare.146  
For parents who do have counsel, many commentators have speculated 
that the due process system harms the ongoing relationship between schools 
and students.147 Unlike many other areas of civil rights law, IDEA due 
process and other education litigation usually implicate a long-term ongoing 
relationship between the specific individuals involved. For example, while 
parties to an employment suit may never interact again after the judgment, 
the two parties in many IDEA cases must in many instances continue to 
work together for years after due process ends as the student continues in 
school after the dispute. School districts argue that private enforcement of 
IDEA as currently constructed creates too much stress for the school staff 
 
140 Telephone Interview with E.F., supra note 130. 
141 Telephone Interview with C.D., supra note 129; Telephone Interview with E.F., supra 
note 130. 
142 See 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (“The burden of proof in an administrative hearing 
challenging an IEP is properly placed on the [parent].”). 
143 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; Telephone Interview with C.D., supra 
note 129. 
144 Telephone Interview with C.D., supra note 129. 
145 Id. 
146 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; E-mail Interview with G.H., supra note 133. 
147 See, e.g., Cope-Kasten, supra note 6, at 506 (noting that when parents are represented by 
counsel, attorneys can “contribute to the delays in the process and heighten the tense, adversarial 
nature of the proceedings” (citations omitted)). 
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members dragged into due process hearings.148 The structure of IDEA itself 
creates inherent tension because due process provides an avenue for parents 
to question the job performance of teachers and staff.149 Even when parents 
are successful, some studies have found that parents and school officials feel 
traumatized and drained by the hearing process.150 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the attorneys dismissed any concerns about 
poisoned relationships between parents and school districts following due 
process. As one attorney put it, “the squeaky wheel gets the grease.”151 That 
is, any school district is more likely to treat a student represented by counsel 
more carefully in the future because “they know [the child’s parents] have a 
lawyer’s number in their pocket.”152 Attorneys also seemed to recognize 
their responsibility to avoid damage to the student–teacher relationship. As 
one attorney stated, “there is a difference between forcefully pointing out 
what’s wrong and going for the humiliation [of school staff].”153 All of the 
attorneys rejected the suggestion that due process caused irreparable 
damage to the relationships between parents and school districts. 
Attorney awareness of the student–teacher relationship is supported by 
the fact that almost all of the attorneys interviewed had a personal or 
professional connection to education advocacy. Several attorneys were 
originally parent advocates who became involved in IDEA work because 
they had children who were disabled students. Others were former members 
of government or public interest organizations advocating for the rights of 
children. The frequent players in the special education due process system 
often have personal experience and a stake in the process and are not simply 
operating as entrepreneurs. 
 
148 See PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 12-13 (providing anecdotal evidence of instructor and 
administrator stress following due process hearings).  
149 See Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the IDEA: Collaborative in Theory, 
Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 423, 433-34 (2012) (explaining that 
“[u]nsurprisingly, there is ‘strong resentment by educators of the parental right and power under 
the Act to challenge the educators’ professional judgment’” (citations omitted)). 
150 See Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve Special 
Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 35, 40-41 (1997) (noting 
that both parents and administrators frequently reflect negatively on due process hearings, 
regardless of their outcome). 
151 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128. 
152 Id. 
153 Telephone Interview with C.D., supra note 129. 
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IV. PRO SE PARENTS AND ACCESS TO COUNSEL  
ISSUES IN PENNSYLVANIA 
 A. Continuing Presence of Pro Se Parents in IDEA Due Process 
Despite the presence of a visible and active private special education bar 
willing to take cases across Pennsylvania, parents continue to proceed pro se 
in roughly one in four IDEA due process hearings.154 Parents proceeding 
pro se are significantly less likely to obtain meaningful relief. One 
explanation for this discrepancy is that these cases lack merit. Pro se 
parents, however, obtain significant relief in 16% of cases.155 Thus, the 
disadvantages of pro se representation cannot be explained by lack of merit 
alone. Another, perhaps more plausible, explanation is that parents are 
unaware that certain lawyers will agree to take cases on a reduced fee or 
contingent fee basis. Therefore, these statistics regarding pro se cases are 
not explained merely by the number of available attorneys. 
 B. Unavailability of Counsel for Low-Income Parents 
The most likely explanations for why parents proceed pro se are that 
they choose to do so or that they are unable to pay for a lawyer. In 2012, 
37.9% of Philadelphia public school students were below the federal poverty 
line.156 The parents of these students generally cannot afford to pay a 
retainer for private counsel. Enrollment in special education in the 
Philadelphia School District is lower than the statewide average.157 
Anecdotal evidence from previous studies suggests that utilization of due 
process is higher in wealthier districts.158 In addition, IDEA’s framework 
may make enforcement of the statute in major violations more difficult in 
poorer districts.159 Because IDEA centers around an IEP and the 
 
154 Supra Table 2. 
155 Supra Table 2. 
156  REVENUES, EXPENDITURES, POVERTY RATE, AND TITLE I ALLOCATIONS OF PUBLIC 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS ENROLLING MORE THAN 15,000 STUDENTS: 2010-11 AND FISCAL YEAR 2013, 
DIGEST OF EDUC. STATS., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., available at http://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_215.20.asp (last visited May 12, 2015). 
157 In the Philadelphia School District, only 13.7% of children receive special education 
services, compared to 15.4% of students statewide. SPECIAL EDUCATION DATA REPORT SCHOOL 
YEAR 2013–2014, PA. ST. DATA CTR. (2014), available at http://penndata.hbg.psu.edu/ 
BSEReports/Data%20Preview/2013_2014/PDF_Documents/Speced_Quick_Report_Final.pdf.  
158 See Pasachoff, supra note 126, at 1426-27 (noting that anecdotal studies in Maine and other 
states suggest that wealthier parents pursue due process more often than low-income parents). 
159 See Hyman, Rivkin & Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at 118-21 (arguing that the procedural 
framework and remedies available through due process favor parents with counsel in districts 
where compliance with the statute is high and harm parents in districts where compliance is poor). 
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procedures used to implement the IEP, districts that are wholly out of 
compliance with the law are more difficult to challenge in court because 
failure to comply creates less of a record for due process.160 Due process 
hearings also favor parents who can afford to pay for an independent 
educational evaluation conducted by an expert to challenge the district’s 
evaluation.161 This cost is prohibitive for most low-income families.162 
Further, the parents who are most likely to proceed pro se are also more 
likely to have less education and familiarity with litigation.163 
Several of the attorneys I interviewed believed that parents overestimate 
the cost of a lawyer.164 However, at least one of the attorneys who charged a 
retainer noted that economic issues have driven more parents to decline to 
move forward with a due process complaint in recent years.165 It is likely 
that many parents are simply unable to afford a lawyer requiring any 
retainer, no matter how small. While some attorneys take cases purely on 
contingency, these attorneys also confirmed they would be more likely to 
take cases where parents had already sought an independent educational 
evaluation on their own.166 As discussed above, the expense of this type of 
evaluation is likely beyond the means of low income parents. 
 C. Alternatives to Due Process for IDEA Dispute Resolution 
Many proposals have been advanced to change or supplement the special 
education due process system with alternative forms of dispute resolution.167 
These alternative mechanisms are designed to mitigate the perceived 
weaknesses of due process, such as that it is too slow, too technical, and too 
costly in comparison to its benefits. As discussed below, however, many of 
the proposed alternatives achieve their purported improvements in 
efficiency by removing parents’ attorneys. This means that many of the 
proposed alternatives are likely to magnify the advantages held by district 
 
160 See id. at 114 (explaining that IDEA due process relies on records created by the school 
and therefore presumes some degree of compliance with the statute). 
161 See id. at 126-28 (noting that the inability to obtain timely independent educational 
evaluations negatively affects the remedies available to low-income families). 
162 See id. at 127 (“[I]t is very difficult for a parent without financial resources to exercise this 
[due process] right.”) 
163 See Chopp, supra note 149, at 452-53 (citing empirical evidence that parents of students 
eligible under IDEA who have minimal education themselves are more likely to be unaware of 
resources available to aid them in due process). 
164 Telephone Interview with C.D., supra note 129; Email from G.H., supra note 133. 
165 Telephone Interview with C.D., supra note 129. 
166 Telephone Interview with A.B., supra note 128; Telephone Interview with E.F., supra 
note 130. 
167 See infra subsections IV.C.1-3. 
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repeat players over parents in determining what services to provide for 
students. 
1. Mediation 
Mediation is a frequently proposed alternative to due process.168 The 
1997 amendments to IDEA added a provision requiring states to offer 
mediation as part of their IDEA administrative regimes; at that time 
Congress expressed its intent that mediation be the primary means of 
resolving special education disputes.169 Mediation allows the district and 
parents to resolve disputes with the assistance of an impartial third party.170 
Mediation can take less time than a due process hearing, since more than 
one session is rarely needed and there is no witness or evidence preparation 
required.171 The result of a successful mediation is a written agreement 
signed by both parties,172 which is legally binding.173  
There is, however, no requirement of a binding result of mediation, and 
the parents and student are free to refuse to sign any such resulting 
agreement. If the mediation fails, the parents are still able to pursue a 
formal due process complaint.174 This is one of the principal critiques of the 
mediation process as currently constructed; in many cases mediation is just 
 
168 See, e.g., Cope-Kasten, supra note 6, at 532 (suggesting that “mandatory mediation [could] 
effectively serve as the final dispute resolution option in special education conflicts”); Kuriloff & 
Goldberg, supra note 150, at 42-43 (arguing that mediation is appropriate in the special education 
context).  
169 See S. REP. NO. 105-17, at 26 (1997) (expressing the Senate Committee’s “strong 
preference that mediation become the norm for resolving disputes under IDEA”); see also EDWARD 
FEINBERG ET AL., BEYOND MEDIATION: STRATEGIES FOR APPROPRIATE EARLY DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 8 (2002) [hereinafter BEYOND MEDIATION], available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Beyond%20Mediation.pdf (discussing the legislative 
history of the IDEA amendments indicating “clear congressional intent that mediation become the 
primary, albeit not the exclusive, process for resolving disputes arising under IDEA”). 
170 See BEYOND MEDIATION, supra note 169, at 25 (explaining that mediation allows all 
parties to work with outside counsel to learn more about the merits of the parties’ positions). 
171 See PA. MEDIATION GUIDE, supra note 78, at 3. 
172 Id. at 5.  
173 See M.R. & B.R. ex rel. D.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“[R]eaching a settlement agreement during mediation, rather than during litigation, does 
not lessen the binding nature of the agreement on the parties.”). 
174 However, some courts have ruled that if the parents and district agree ex ante to make 
mediation binding, such an agreement will preclude later due process complaints. See Amy S. v. 
Danbury Local Sch. Dist., 174 F. App’x 896, 901 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]ll of the Parents’ claims in 
the lawsuit . . . are covered by the unambiguous language of the mediation agreements. Because 
the Defendants did not breach the mediation agreements, the Parents’ claims are barred by the 
fact that they were settled.”).  
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a step on the road to a due process hearing.175 Thus, some have proposed 
that mandatory binding arbitration (with the consent of all parties) can be a 
way of capturing the efficiency gains of mediation and the binding effect of 
a final decision.176 
In theory, the benefits of mediation seem to make it an attractive 
alternative to due process. In practice, however, mediation in Pennsylvania 
leaves parents without the benefit of counsel and at a distinct disadvantage 
to district officials. However, allowing counsel to participate in mediation 
would not necessarily solve these problems, as no fee recovery provision 
exists for attorneys who resolve disputes at mediation, making counsel 
available only to parents who could afford an attorney. 
ODR does not allow parents to be represented by counsel in 
mediation.177 This poses significant problems for parents opposed by district 
officials who are repeat players.178 As one private attorney observed, it is 
“insane to think that districts don’t have lawyers and aren’t talking to them,” 
and that even if the district does not have lawyers in the room, they “aren’t 
talking to them on the phone in the hallway.”179 The advantages of having a 
lawyer in a due process proceeding apply equally in mediation.180 Further, 
mediation does not offer even the limited access to school documents and 
personnel provided in a due process hearing. Districts would have little, if 
any, incentive to disclose information harmful to their position in 
mediation. 
While some studies have found that parents are generally satisfied with 
mediation, the studies do not examine whether parents actually obtained 
 
175 See S. James Rosenfeld, It’s Time for an Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure, 32 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 544, 548-49 (2012) (“[M]ediation is often perceived as a ‘poor 
man’s’ alternative to a due process hearing, a settlement for the best that can be obtained in the 
absence of legal representation.”). 
176 See id. at 555 (proposing binding arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism and noting “the importance of the finality of a special education arbitration proceeding 
is difficult to understate”). 
177 PA. MEDIATION GUIDE, supra note 78, at 2.  
178 See Sonja Kerr & Jenai St. Hill, Mediation of Special Education Disputes in Pennsylvania, 15 
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 179, 181-82 (2012) (arguing that mediation significantly 
disadvantages parents because of ODR’s prohibition of counsel); Andrea Shemberg, Mediation as 
an Alternative Method of Dispute Resolution for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Just 
Proposal?, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 739, 750 (1997) (explaining that most parents are “not 
skilled at presenting grievances to experienced professionals” and therefore are at a disadvantage 
against district repeat players, even with the presence of a mediator); see also Kuriloff & Goldberg, 
supra note 150, at 55 (finding that parents represented by counsel were more satisfied with the 
results of mediation than parents without counsel). 
179 Phone Interview with C.D., supra note 129. 
180 See supra Part III. 
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more relief.181 It is unlikely that parents would be able to obtain more relief 
in a less formal proceeding without counsel than they are able to in the 
current system, where they frequently achieve significant redress through 
due process (and even more do so through settlement). Without counsel, 
much of the flexibility of the remedies allowed by settlement (i.e., the 
availability of prospective relief )  is lost. Unrepresented parents are unlikely 
to fully understand the remedies available under the complicated IDEA 
remedial scheme182 or how to bargain for a potential award of compensatory 
education in exchange for a prospective remedy.183 Unless opposed by 
counsel and negotiating in the shadow of a potentially large compensatory 
claim, districts would be less likely to offer such expensive relief. Moreover, 
mediation settlements are drafted by non-lawyers, often resulting in 
unenforceable agreements.184 
If attorneys are unable to recover fees in mediation, they are either less 
likely to take cases or more likely to charge higher retainers, reducing 
parents’ access to counsel. In addition, some attorneys noted that when they 
deal with cases from parents who have already proceeded through 
mediation, the lack of legal knowledge of both parties results in agreements 
that are not legally intelligible in terms of the IDEA’s statutory 
requirements.185 
Even if parents have representation by counsel, mediation would 
become at best a prelude to due process hearings. Pennsylvania special 
education attorneys have advocated for changes to the rules, such as 
allowing attorneys at mediation and permitting the recovery of fees for 
mediation settlements for parents who obtain significant relief from the 
district through the settlement.186 Yet, with attorneys present, the “non-
confrontational” advantages of mediation would be reduced. Resolution 
 
181 See Kuriloff & Goldberg, supra note 150, at 63-66 (identifying correlations between 
parents’ and school officials’ perceptions of fairness). 
182 The thicket of complicated equitable remedies developed by courts for the IDEA is very 
difficult for parents to navigate. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. See generally Parental 
Rights Under IDEA, CENTER FOR PARENT INFO. & RES. ( Jan. 2014), http:// 
www.parentcenterhub.org/repository/parental-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/BW6T-DMPF 
(providing an overview of the procedural and substantive safeguards in IDEA). 
183 See supra Part III (discussing tactics used by parents’ attorneys in due process settlement 
negotiations). 
184 See supra Part III; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 175, at 548 n.12 (“In reviewing requests for 
pro bono representation by our law school clinic over a period of four years, I was amazed at how 
many applicants submitted mediation settlement agreements that were so imprecise as to be 
rendered unenforceable.”). 
185 Telephone Interview with C.D., supra note 129. 
186 See Kerr & St. Hill, supra note 178, at 196 (“Congress should . . . encourage mediation by 
permitting attorneys’ fees for resolving cases through mediation.”). 
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meetings are already required by statute before parties can proceed to due 
process.187 Districts would certainly not have a greater incentive to settle at 
mediation than they would in the face of a hearing officer order.  
The presence of a third-party mediator, no matter how independent and 
skilled in conflict resolution, can do little to mitigate the information 
asymmetry inherent in the dynamics of students and parents versus school 
administrators. Further, mediation encourages parties to seek compromise, 
assuming the parties’ positions are equally, or at least partially, valid. Such 
an arrangement is of less utility where the incentives for districts are 
influenced by budgetary constraints; there is little room for districts to give 
ground when doing so will result in increased expenditures.  
 2. Facilitated IEPs 
Another alternative to the due process system is an expansion of the 
existing system of facilitated IEPs. Frequently mentioned with mediation as 
an alternate dispute resolution setting for IDEA, IEP facilitation involves a 
neutral third-party during IEP meetings between parents and the school’s 
IEP team.188 While not as formal as mediation, this process has the same 
goal of encouraging parties to focus on the substantive issues relating to 
service provision for the child. IEP facilitation is a service offered by ODR 
in Pennsylvania, but it is not required by statute or ODR rule.189 Facilitated 
IEP meetings involve the same general process as a regular IEP meeting, 
but the third-party facilitator is intended to ensure open communication 
and focus on the needs of the student.190 The facilitator does not “chair the 
meeting,” instead “tak[ing] a secondary role.”191 
The AASA report recommends the expansion of the facilitated IEP 
process as a solution to the perceived problems of the due process system.192 
The AASA proposes replacing the current system of optional mediation and 
resolution sessions followed by due process hearings with facilitated IEPs 
 
187 20 U.S.C. § 1415( f )(1)(B)(i)(IV) (2012). 
188 See Cope-Kasten, supra note 6, at 505 (noting that facilitated IEP meetings may help “the 
parties stay focused on material, rather than personal, issues”). See generally BEYOND 
MEDIATION, supra note 169, at 31-34 (examining a variety of non-adversarial conflict resolution 
strategies for IDEA disputes, including IEP facilitation and third-party mediation). 
189 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
190 See IEP Facilitation—Pennsylvania, NAT’L CENTER ON DISP. RESOL. IN SPECIAL 
EDUC., http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ctu/practicesB.cfm?id=120 (last visited May 12, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7MRN-ZSWY (“The IEP Facilitator assists in creating an 
atmosphere for fair communication and the successful drafting of an IEP for the student.”). 
191 Id. 
192 See PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 17-23 (proposing a two-prong approach to replace the due 
process system that includes creating a mandatory facilitated IEP meeting).  
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followed by “consultant IEPs.”193 If facilitated IEPs fail, the parties would 
then select an independent “IEP consultant” from a state education agency 
list.194 The consultant will review the child’s record and create a new IEP.195 
Any appeal would occur in federal court.196 
Facilitated IEPs have several benefits. First, unlike the due process 
system that addresses past violations, facilitated IEPs inherently focus on 
the child’s future education.197 Presumably an independent facilitator will 
better inform parents of their child’s rights under the statute. The presence 
of a facilitator might result in better IEPs in terms of their substantive 
content, organization, and quality, because the facilitator would be an expert 
in IEP drafting. Parents and teachers, the primary members of the IEP 
team today, are not as familiar with an IEP’s requirements. Finally, IEP 
facilitators might reduce tension between parents and schools by keeping 
discussions away from personal disputes. 
IEP facilitation has some benefits over mediation. For example, it occurs 
earlier and may keep disputes from reaching the point where mediation is 
required. In addition, a truly independent facilitator might mitigate the 
information asymmetry between parents and schools by ensuring that 
parents fully understand their rights. Research suggests that IEP 
facilitation, like mediation, results in participants feeling more satisfied with 
the process.198 
IEP facilitation has some of the same drawbacks as mediation. 
Depending on the nature of the meeting, IEP facilitators may not be able to 
fully inform parents of their rights under the statute in the same way that 
an attorney would. The information asymmetry between the parties may 
continue to result in school districts outmaneuvering or pressuring parents. 
In addition, the IEP facilitation system does nothing to provide remedies 
for parents or disincentives for districts. A system of IEP consultation as 
proposed by the AASA report similarly does not provide any solution to 
past violations of the statute. Therefore, IEP facilitation alone does not 
serve all of the roles that the due process system does because it removes 
 
193 Id. at 17-18.  
194 Id. at 20. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 21. 
197 This also contrasts with IDEA in practice, which usually results in compensatory 
education or tuition reimbursement, both retrospective remedies. See supra notes 123-125 and 
accompanying text; see also Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies, supra note 73, at 228 (noting that in a 
sample of district court rulings, tuition reimbursement and compensatory education represented 
36% and 30% of all remedies, respectively). 
198 See PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 19 (providing examples of “solid evidence” demonstrating 
the effectiveness of IEP facilitation in various states). 
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the compensatory remedies that courts have held are essential to the 
statute.199 
 3. Public Enforcement 
Instead of seeking to limit the flaws of the existing due process 
framework, as mediation attempts to do, another option to mitigate the 
problems of the due process system is to increase public enforcement of the 
statute.200 Public enforcement could utilize existing agencies, such as the 
Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs.201 Such a 
regime would involve either increasing regulation and oversight of school 
districts by an administrative agency or attaching performance targets to 
federal funds, or some combination of both. Public enforcement would be 
particularly well-suited to mitigate the access problems posed by the private 
enforcement regime of due process by putting students on equal footing 
regardless of their ability to hire a private attorney.202  
Increased public enforcement of IDEA, like most civil rights statutes, is 
almost certainly desirable. However, public enforcement would be 
expensive.203 Federal and state governments are highly unlikely to assume 
the burden currently shouldered by private enforcement. The new 
enforcement regime would also be dependent on continued legislative 
support. Perhaps more troublingly, public enforcement in other areas of 
special education is already weak.204 Because of the scope of national 
 
199 See Octavia P. ex rel. Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that 
IDEA both creates a right to FAPE and requires courts to “provide relief which remedies the 
deprivation of that right” (citations omitted)). 
200 See Pasachoff, supra note 126, at 1461-88 (proposing a regime of public enforcement of 
IDEA through federal mandates for increased district disclosure, investigation of noncompliance, 
and changes in funding levels based on compliance); cf. Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of 
Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 453-55 (2007) (suggesting possible benefits of public 
enforcement to supplement private enforcement in the ADA context).  
201 The Office of Special Education Programs administers IDEA formula grants to states and 
also implements programs designed to ensure compliance with the statute. Office of Special 
Education Programs Mission Statement, DEPARTMENT EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/osers/osep/mission.html (last visited May 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/AN5T-
H8MN.  
202 Pasachoff, supra note 126, at 1462 (“Where a statute is enacted to effectuate a particular 
public policy and private enforcement is inefficient to effectuate that policy, it is reasonable to 
suggest that public enforcement is necessary if the statute is to be properly administered.”). 
203 See id. at 1482 (estimating costs of increased monitoring and “intradistrict comparison” 
investigations to be $2.8 billion per year). 
204 See Theresa Glennon, Evaluating the Office for Civil Rights’ Minority and Special Education 
Project  (examining the effectiveness of the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights’ 
efforts to reduce the disproportionate representation of minority students in special education and 
finding that a lack of resources, an overly broad mission, and limited scope of powers delegated by 
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enforcement, even relatively small numbers of complaints can dwarf the 
resources allocated to the enforcing agency.205 Enforcement rates of other 
disability statutes that are administered by the Department of Justice or 
disability advocacy organizations, such as the accessibility provisions of the 
Fair Housing Act, are very low.206 
Moreover, systemic violations are likely not the cause of most IDEA 
violations. Many individual situations resolved through due process are 
likely to be the result of good faith disagreements between parents and 
districts about the services required for a particular student. In addition, 
most attorneys interviewed in Pennsylvania for this study reported that 
they saw little evidence of widespread systemic violations.207 
CONCLUSION: COMPETING NARRATIVES OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL 
IN IDEA DUE PROCESS 
The IDEA due process system as currently constructed does achieve 
results for parents. During the five-year period studied in this Comment, 
Pennsylvania parents won some relief in almost half of all due process 
hearings that reached a final decision, many of which resulted in significant 
awards to students.208 As many as four or five times that number settled 
before a due process hearing, achieving substantive relief for students.209 
Contrary to the AASA’s assertions that due process is a “small and, at times, 
hollow means for parents to ensure district [sic] are complying with 
IDEA,”210 the empirical results in Pennsylvania and the experience of 
 
Congress hampered public enforcement), in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 195, 
201-03 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002). 
205 See id. at 206-07 (discussing how an agency that had jurisdiction over only a small section 
of the disabled student population spent almost 60% of staff time investigating received 
complaints). 
206 See, e.g., CAROLINE PEATTIE & JESSICA TANKERSLEY, MARIN COUNTY ANALYSIS OF 
IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUSING CHOICE 28-30 (2011), available at http://www.marincounty.org/ 
~/media/files/departments/cd/federal-grants/analysis_of_impediments_to_fair_housing_choice.pdf 
(noting that a lack of federal and local funding consistently hampered community organization 
and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act). 
207 See supra Part III. This is not to say that systemic violations of IDEA are unheard of, 
even in states with active private enforcement such as Pennsylvania. See Disproportionality: 
Segregation Through Special Education, PUB. INT. L. CENTER PHILA., http://www.pilcop.org/ 
lower-merion-school-district-segregation-through-special-education/#more-847 (last visited May 
12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/NS73-92EW (discussing ongoing litigation against Lower 
Merion School District alleging systemic excessive characterization of minority students as 
needing special education outside of mainstream classrooms).  
208 See supra Section II.C. 
209 This figure is based on the estimates provided by private attorneys. See supra Part III.  
210 PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 7. 
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special education lawyers based in Pennsylvania is that IDEA is a powerful 
tool to ensure continued compliance by districts.211 This success rate is 
significantly higher than what it was in the early years of the due process 
system in Pennsylvania.212 The development of an aggressive and 
experienced private bar likely contributed to this increased success. 
Districts and schools dislike the due process system because it is 
expensive and burdensome. But the system is expensive and burdensome 
because districts are often not in compliance with federal law. The AASA 
report claims that 40% of surveyed school administrators consented to 
“unreasonable, unnecessary, or inappropriate requests by parents” if the cost 
of compliance with federal law was “less than 20% of the cost to move 
forward with due process.”213 The 70–90% settlement rate estimated by 
members of the private bar in Pennsylvania might tend to support an 
assertion that districts are settling rather than taking chances on due process 
hearings. But when hearings do reach a decision, the near 60% success rate 
of parents represented by counsel, combined with the fact that parents 
proceeding pro se receive substantive relief, suggests that there is surplus 
capacity for litigation in the system.  
Although due process litigation is expensive, there is not a substantial 
amount of special education litigation; in fact, the amount is low relative to 
the number of disabled students.214 It is now significantly more difficult to 
enforce IDEA through private actions due to the Supreme Court’s 
increasingly skeptical view of private rights of action.215 Moreover, 
Pennsylvania has already streamlined the process once in recent years, with 
the removal of administrative appeals panels from the IDEA process in 
2009.216 Estimates of the cost of special education litigation vary, but the 
 
211 See supra Part II. 
212 See Steven S. Goldberg & Peter J. Kuriloff, Doing Away with Due Process: Seeking 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Special Education, 42 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 491, 495 (1988) 
(explaining that parents in Pennsylvania prevailed significantly less often than districts at the due 
process stage and that parents reported dissatisfaction with the hearing process); see also Kuriloff, 
supra note 100, at 109 (finding that the presence of counsel did not affect the success rates of 
parents during the first four years of due process hearings in the 1970s). 
213 PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 12.  
214 See Bagenstos, supra note 99, at 127-29 (citing two studies that found an annual average of 
approximately fifty-eight due process hearings for every 10,000 special education students). 
215 J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1170-72 (2012) (noting that the heightened post-Twombly and Iqbal 
pleading standard and the Supreme Court’s decisions limiting class actions have made private 
enforcement of law—especially civil rights law—much more difficult). 
216 Prior to amending rules in 2008, Pennsylvania had a two-tier system, with administrative 
hearing officer decisions being appealed to a three-officer panel prior to an appeal to federal court. 
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cost of any estimate is an extremely small proportion of the school district 
budgets, particularly given the number of cases that actually proceed to due 
process hearings.217 
The above estimates all refer to cases that make it to a district court on 
appeal. The vast majority of due process cases terminate at ODR. Even at 
the administrative level in Pennsylvania, the proportion of cases decided to 
the number of students eligible under IDEA is extraordinarily small. In 
2009–2010—the school year with the most hearing officer decisions during 
the studied period—only 122 due process complaints made it all the way to a 
hearing officer decision.218 That same year, 270,150 students in Pennsylvania 
schools qualified for special education under IDEA.219 Due process 
complaints reaching a final hearing officer decision represented only .0004% 
of enrolled special education students. Even assuming that 90% of all cases 
are settled prior to a hearing, multiplying the number of decisions by ten 
would result in an estimate of a mere 1200 due process complaints each year. 
In the most extreme estimates, the direct administrative costs of the due 
process system are miniscule compared with school district budgets.220 
 Due process also has several important ancillary benefits that serve to 
complement, rather than detract from, alternative dispute resolution 
systems such as mediation. ODR hearing officer decisions, despite being 
redacted prior to dissemination, constitute an important body of precedent 
and a resource for both parents and advocates to understand the available 
rights and remedies under IDEA. These decisions also provide a baseline 
for settlement negotiations between parents and districts. This resource 
would be lost if even more disputes were handled informally or off the 
record through mediation or settlements, where the resulting agreements 
are kept secret.  
In addition, parent and student success in IDEA hearings likely has 
secondary effects that improve future district compliance with the law. 
 
OFFICE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ANNUAL REPORT 2008–2009, at 16, available at 
http://odr-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/ODR0809ar.pdf. 
217 See PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 13-14 (estimating that the total cost of a due process case 
could be as much as $50,000 if the parent prevailed and the district was compelled to pay both a 
judgment and the parent’s attorneys’ fees); Bagenstos, supra note 99, at 129 (citing estimates that 
the annual expenditure per open litigation in federal court was roughly $100,000). 
218 See supra Table 1. 
219 SPECIAL EDUCATION DATA REPORT SCHOOL YEAR 2009–2010, PA. ST. DATA 
CENTER (2010), http://penndata.hbg.psu.edu/BSEReports/Data%20Preview/2009_2010/PDF_ 
Documents/Speced_Quick_Report_State_Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M2PJ-YLFF. 
220 See, e.g., SCH. DIST. OF PHILA. FY 2013-14 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET, supra note 32, 
at 315 (recording the 2012 fiscal year budget for the School District of Philadelphia’s General 
Counsel’s office alone as approximately $8 million). 
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First, due process reminds school and district staff of the substantive 
requirements of IDEA. Second, costly compensatory education awards are 
powerful motivators for districts to ensure staff are adequately trained and 
provide necessary services. Further, the procedural requirements of IDEA, 
which are often maligned by teachers as unduly burdensome and overly 
focused on potential due process claims,221 force districts and teachers to 
create records and rationalize their decisions regarding the education of 
disabled children. These records can later be used to evaluate the 
programming provided. 
Critics correctly attack the IDEA’s due process system for its emphasis 
on providing retroactive relief through hearing officer decisions rather than 
providing for the future educational needs of the child.222 But to critique 
the necessarily ex post nature of due process neglects the benefits of the 
current system discussed above. The system, as currently constructed, 
results in meaningful relief for a significant percentage of parents and 
students. Due process decisions have valuable secondary effects, both in 
terms of cases that settle favorably for parents prior to a hearing and for 
increased compliance by school districts following a due process complaint. 
But perhaps more importantly, any system that eliminates retroactive relief, 
or that requires parents to pursue such relief only in expensive federal court 
proceedings, risks leaving disabled students with rights but without 
practical remedies for violations of those rights.  
If dispute resolution mechanisms prior to due process are desired, these 
developments ought to be encouraged in addition to the current due process 
regime. Facilitated IEP meetings, in particular, have the valuable promise 
of putting an informed person in the room to better assist parents and 
school district personnel in understanding the requirements of the law. 
Because the IEP itself ends up being the key document in most IDEA 
disputes, drafting better IEPs may go a long way in reducing disputes later 
in the process. This promise is particularly true where parents enter 
meetings at an information disadvantage and only discover their rights once 
the provision of services under an IEP begins. At that point, the parents’ 
only option in many cases is to pursue retroactive relief in the form of 
compensatory education because the violation has already occurred. 
Underlying much of the debate about IDEA due process is a 
disagreement about the value lawyers bring to the process. While critiques 
of due process are framed in terms of the “adversarial” or “litigious” nature 
of the process, this critique is essentially aimed at parents’ lawyers and the 
 
221 PUDELSKI, supra note 1, at 23-24. 
222 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.  
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procedural apparatus that provides parents represented by lawyers leverage 
over school districts. In this narrative, parents’ lawyers are responsible for 
interfering with the professional judgment of teachers and school 
administrators and for using the procedural protections of due process to 
secure unneeded or undeserved services from schools. Consequently, due 
process complaints are unnecessary: many are frivolous, and the meritorious 
complaints would be best resolved through an informal (and, implicitly, 
more amicable) dispute resolution process, such as mediation. 
Left undiscussed in this narrative is the inevitability of lawyers 
representing school districts. As a starting point, school districts already 
have an advantage over parents simply by maintaining control of 
information and school records about the student’s education. In addition, 
as repeat players, school administrators are already at least somewhat 
familiar with the IDEA process. School district experts who prepare reports 
and create a record are employees of the district and available as needed. 
Further, a school administrator would be foolish, perhaps even negligent, to 
approach any conflict resolution session, no matter how informal, without 
first consulting legal counsel in some capacity. By contrast, only affluent 
parents have the resources to consult a lawyer for advice on their position 
before participating in an informal dispute resolution setting.  
There is an alternative narrative, however: lawyers in special education 
due process cases serve a crucial role in leveling the playing field between 
parents and districts. This narrative does not doubt the good intentions of 
teachers or administrators, or impute to them any malice against students 
with disabilities. Instead, it recognizes that the incentives for school 
districts are not always in perfect alignment with the interests of students 
with disabilities. Particularly where school budgets represent a constant or 
shrinking pie, it is not cynical to think that districts might legitimately 
struggle to ensure that every student is receiving the services IDEA 
requires. 
This narrative is validated in light of the results of the Pennsylvania 
ODR decisions examined in this Comment. Not only were a significant 
number of claims meritorious—as almost half of all due process hearings 
resulted in a remedy for the parents and student—but when parents were 
represented by counsel, a majority of cases resulted favorably for the parents 
and student. If a significant (or overwhelming) majority of cases settle 
before reaching a hearing,223 compliance with IDEA’s requirements must be 
far from perfect.  
 
223 See generally supra Part III. 
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Quite strikingly, the number of prior appearances by the lawyer, as a 
very rough proxy for experience, has little effect on the success rates of 
parents.224 It appears that simply having a lawyer is a significant advantage. 
This finding is likely due, in part, to the technical nature of the due process 
hearing. It is also almost certainly the result of applying the critical eye of 
someone knowledgeable about IDEA to the case from the perspective of the 
parent and student, with the aim of achieving the best possible outcome for 
the student. No third-party neutral facilitator would be able to replicate this 
adversarial position (setting aside issues of capture of mediators by school 
districts who are the frequent players in disputes). 
There is a critical role for lawyers in the IDEA system, particularly 
given the complicated nature of the statute.225 While encouraging 
alternative dispute resolution systems might have value, it is unclear that 
these alternative systems would be pursued by parents. Given the relatively 
low use of the procedural safeguards in IDEA compared to the number of 
students covered by the statute today,226 there is little to suggest that 
mediation or facilitated IEPs would result in more enforcement of the 
substantive requirements of the statute. On the other hand, encouraging 
more lawyers to become involved in the due process system might result in 
a more rigorous pursuit of some of the meritorious due process claims of 
pro se parents,227 in turn resulting in more cases brought to ensure 
compliance with the statute.  
One change to the due process system that would both encourage more 
attorneys to become involved in the system and help to create access for low 
income parents is to implement a statutory fee-shifting provision to apply 
to parents’ costs for hiring experts for due process hearings.228 Currently, 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Arlington Central School District Board 
of Education v. Murphy,229 parents cannot recover the fees for expert 
witnesses through the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision.230 Therefore, parents 
face the possibility of outlaying significant costs to hire an expert witness to 
prove that the school district misidentified or failed to provide adequate 
 
224 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
225 See Hyman, Rivkin & Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at 141 (noting that lawyers are 
particularly important because they understand what remedies are available under the statute and 
how they can be applied to a case). 
226 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.  
227 See supra Section IV.A. 
228 See Hyman, Rivkin & Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at 142 (singling out the expense of 
hiring experts as one of the primary barriers to parents pursuing due process complaints). 
229 548 U.S. 291 (2006).  
230 See supra note 84-89 and accompanying text. 
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services for their child without any possibility of reimbursement, even if 
they prevail and demonstrate that the school district failed to comply with 
the statute. 
Revisiting the oft-criticized Buckhannon231 ruling, which limited the 
ability to recover fees for settlements lacking a judicial imprimatur, is also a 
possible next step.232 This step would require congressional action to 
expressly allow recovery of fees under the catalyst theory in IDEA cases. 
Allowing the recovery of fees for settlements reached prior to due process 
would both encourage enforcement and reduce some of the stress cited by 
districts in the AASA report.233 Many of the attorneys with whom I spoke 
noted that they always filed a due process claim to reach a resolution 
meeting where the settlement would both be judicially enforceable and 
allow them to collect fees. Allowing attorneys at least a possibility of 
collecting fees prior to the filing of a due process claim might actually 
reduce administrative costs and the stress on district personnel who would 
not be dragged into due process. 
Of course, the counterpoint to the narrative of the positive contribution 
of lawyers to the system is one that focuses on the zero-sum game of school 
budgets in an era where there is shrinking funding from all sources. If 
special education due process is simply a process of taking money from 
general education funds to apply it to special education students, then the 
argument made by the AASA and others is that this simply results in the 
benefit of a fortunate few against the needs of the many. But to adopt this 
attitude is essentially to give up on IDEA’s promise and purpose. After all, 
IDEA does not require the best possible education for children with 
disabilities; rather, it simply requires a free, appropriate public education 
“reasonably calculated” to achieve “meaningful educational benefit.”234 It is 
difficult to argue that we cannot, as a society, afford to guarantee that this 
minimum standard is available for all students.  
After all, the due process system comprises a relatively small overhead 
cost compared to the scope of school budgets overall.235 The ability of 
parents and students to use the due process system and an attorney to 
 
231 532 U.S. 598 (2001); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
232 See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: 
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1118-
20 (2007) (examining the ways in which the elimination of the catalyst theory for attorneys’ fees 
has made it significantly more difficult for public interest attorneys to enforce civil rights statutes 
through private actions). 
233 PUDELSKI, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra notes 217-220 and accompanying text. 
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ensure their substantive rights is a valuable safeguard, particularly in an era 
when budget constraints force districts to make tough choices. Replacing or 
limiting the due process system would effectively remove this valuable 
check on the authority of school districts.  
